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Prohibiting "Good Faith" Reports
Under the Uniform Mediation Act:
Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out
of the Mediation Tent
Carol L. Izumi and Homer C. La Rue'
I. INTRODUCTION
This symposium article examines a narrow slice of the Uniform
Mediation Act - the prohibition on mediator communication to judges about a
party's good faith participation or "problem" behavior in mediation. Early drafts
of the Uniform Mediation Act (hereafter "UMA") contemplated exceptions to the
mediation privilege, including claims that a party failed to negotiate in good faith.
Ultimately, Section 7(a) reads in pertinent part:
(a) Except as required in subsection (b), a mediator may not make a
report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding or other
communication regarding a mediation to a court, administrative agency,
or other authority that may make a ruling on the dispute that is the
subject of the mediation.
(b) A mediator may disclose:
(1) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a
settlement was reached, and attendance;
(3) a mediation communication evidencing abuse, neglect, abandonment,
or exploitation of an individual to a public agency responsible for
protecting individuals against such mistreatment.
The Reporter's Notes state:
Importantly, the prohibition is limited to reports or other listed
communications to those who may rule on the dispute being mediated.
While the mediators are thus constrained in terms of reports to courts and
others that may make rulings on the case, they are not prohibited from
reporting threatened harm to appropriate authorities, for example, if
1. Carol L. Izumi is a Professor of Clinical Law and the Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs at
George Washington University Law School. Homer C. La Rue is a Professor of Law at Howard
University School of Law. Their research assistants, Erika Thomas and Sherell Daniels, provided
invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
2. Unif. Mediation Act 7(a) (2001) (available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc-final.
htm>).
HeinOnline  -- 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 67 2003
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2003, No. 1
learned during a mediation to settle a civil dispute... The provisions
would not permit a mediator to communicate, for example, whether a
particular party engaged in 'good faith' negotiation, or to state whether a
party had been 'the problem' in reaching a settlement. Section 7(b)(1),
however, does permit disclosure of particular facts, including attendance
and whether a settlement was reached. For example, a mediator may
report that one party did not attend and another attended for the first five
minutes. States with 'good faith' mediation laws or court rules may want
to consider the interplay between such laws and this Section of the Act.3
During the past several years, there has been a robust debate within the
dispute resolution community about the wisdom, practicality, and need for good
faith requirements in mediation participation, which would allow or even compel
mediators to report party behavior to judges. This article briefly surveys the
debate and argues that good faith requirements strike at the heart of the mediation
process by undermining core mediation values of party self-determination,
confidentiality, and third party neutrality.4 Furthermore, allowing or requiring a
mediator to disclose specifics about what occurred during mediation elevates legal
values over mediation values. When we refer to "legal values," we refer to those
qualities of a lawyer and/or legal institutions which most in the profession would
find desirable, useful, and important to their role as lawyers and/or to the integrity
of various legal institutions. These legal values include judicial control, efficiency
of the process, a finding of "right" and "wrong", client advocacy, and defining
client interests and needs in terms of legal remedies. Similarly, "mediation
values" refer to those qualities of the process of mediation and/or those
characteristics of the third-party which participants in the process find desirable,
useful, and important to the ongoing viability and integrity of the process.
Mediation values include confidentiality, mediator impartiality, and party self-
determination.
The latter part of the article reviews fundamental considerations that
may lead parties to select one dispute resolution process over another. In making
that choice, it is fair to conclude that the parties subscribe to the standards and
attributes of their chosen process. We suggest that referring court cases to
mediation as a matter of course may create "process dissonance." The attributes
of mediation may be preferred by the parties and may be more suitable to quality
dispute resolution in certain cases. Mixed messages and conflicting priorities,
however, are imposed upon the participants when mediation is inserted into the
litigation setting. The adjudicative process and the mediation process demand and
expect vastly different approaches by the parties and their representatives. Good
faith requirements exacerbate the "process dissonance" problem by conflating
litigation and mediation values. As a result, both processes are ill-served and
damaged.
3. Unif. Mediation Act 7(b)(1) (2001) (available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcjfinal.
htm>).
4. For a more in depth analysis of good faith arguments, see John Lande, Using Dispute System
Design Models to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50
UCLA L. Rev. 69 (2002) (proposing the use of system design principles to promote desired conduct).
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We conclude with the assertion that the UMA strikes the correct balance
by rejecting arguments in favor of mediator reports to judges and others about the
actions and statements of parties during the mediation for the purpose of assessing
and sanctioning "bad faith" behavior. For the rare and extreme case, the UMA
provides a mechanism to address egregious party behavior such as lying and
fraudulent inducements causing another party to settle.
II. THE "GOOD FAITH" DEBATE
The task of drafting of the UMA included soliciting opinions and
feedback from academics, judges, practitioners, and others in the dispute
resolution community and assessing the competing arguments and considerations
for alternative language. Over the past several years, a good deal of energy and
paper has been dedicated to a discussion of participation standards for mandatory
mediation.5 The vigorousness of the discussion has coincided with the expansion
of mandatory mediation. During the boom years of the late 1980's-early 1990's,
5. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing it Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation'?, 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 47 (1991) (reporting that Florida mediators and attorneys have
mixed views of a good faith requirement); James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the
Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 171 (2001) (surveying
recent cases "dealing with the requirement to mediate in good faith");Tony Biller, Student Author,
Good-Faith Mediation: Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North Carolina's Pre-Trial
Process, 18 Campbell L. Rev. 281 (1996) (proposing a scheme to enforce good faith participation in
mediated settlement conferences); Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation About the Current
Status and the Future of ADR: A View From the Courts, 2000 J. Dis. Res. 11 (identifying the problems
that arise from "formally imposing" a good faith requirement in court ordered mediation); Roger L.
Carter, Oh Ye of Little [Good] Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate
Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. Dis. Res. 367 (proposing narrowly tailored rules for
mediation participants to reduce bad faith conduct and preserve party autonomy); Kathleen A. Devine,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Policies, Participation, and Proposals, 11 Rev. Litig. 83 (1991)
(arguing that good faith requirements improve ADR proceedings); Alan Kirtley, The Mediation
Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to
Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. Dis. Res. 1 (comparing
mediation privilege statutes); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good-Faith in Mediation-Requested,
Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 575 (1997) (exhorting the need for a
good faith requirement to combat bad faith behavior in mediation); Charles J. McPheeters, Student
Author, Leading Horses to Water: May Courts Which Have the Power to Order Attendance at
Mediation Also Require Good-Faith Negotiation?, 1992 J. Dis. Res. 377 (promoting good faith
negotiation for "effective and efficient" use of ADR processes); Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated
Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should be Required?, 46 S.M.U. L. Rev.
2079 (Summer 1993) [hereinafter Court-Mandated] (measuring the types of participation required
against the objectives of court-ordered ADR); Edward F. Sherman, Good Faith' Participation in
Mediation: Aspirational, Not Mandatory, 4 Dis. Res. Mag. 14 (Winter 1997)[hereinafter Aspirational]
(proposing that mediation in good faith should be aspirational and not a mandatory requirement
enforced by sanctions); Mathew A. Tenerowicz, Student Author, "Case Dismissed "-or Is it? Sanctions
for Failure to Participate in Court-Mandated ADR, 13 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 975 (1998)
(promoting appropriate sanctions for bad faith behavior); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant
Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation,
Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 Ind. L.J. 591 (2001) (advocating a good-faith standard to protect
parties in mediation); David S. Winston, Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes:
"You Can Lead a Horse to Water .. " 11 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 187 (1996) (arguing for a more
objective participation standard than "vague 'good faith'); Alexandria Zylstra, The Road From
Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory Good Faith Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled, 17 J. Am.
Acad, Matrim. Law. 69 (2001) (opposing good faith requirements in family law cases).
2003]
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the use of mediation proliferated dramatically; mediation was adopted in courts
for civil, probate, employment, civil rights, commercial, family, and other types of
cases.6  Originally an oxymoron, mandatory mediation became the prevailing
model. With the shift from voluntary to mandatory mediation, concerns over
party underutilization of programs and attorney reticence to initiate mediation
were no longer paramount since participants are ordered to attend at the court's
instigation. Rather, the concern "du jour" was that parties or their lawyers would
misbehave and misuse the process if they were forced to attend court-ordered
mediation sessions.
A. Arguments In Favor of A Good Faith Participation Requirement
A "good faith" requirement as discussed in this article is a directive to
parties and others to participate in the mediation process "in good faith" or with
"best efforts." Proponents of a good faith requirement urge that a number of
sound reasons compel such a standard for participation. Their reasoning falls into
three basic categories: protecting parties against abusive and inappropriate
behavior in mediation; putting participants on notice of acceptable behavior in
mediation; and efficiency. They maintain that good faith requirements are
necessary for the mediation process to work effectively as a creative, collaborative
dispute resolution process in which parties take into account differing perspectives
and positions.
Now that courts routinely funnel cases to mediation before trial, the
population using mediation services has grown. Lawyer-participants who have
become regular attendees in court-mandated mediation have triggered the demand
for firm standards for acceptable participation. 7  Inserting "Rambo-style"
litigators into the mediation process raises fears of lawyers playing litigation
games, engaging in fishing expeditions for discovery purposes, trying to gain
advantage over an opponent, or putting on a charade to comply with the court's
order.8
Elevated numbers of pro se parties ordered to mediation create a
potentially uneven setting that would allow represented parties and counsel to use
the process to the disadvantage of the unrepresented. "Because ADR use is
largely unaccountable and the players unregulated, the potential to exploit
bargaining power or abuse the process is ripe, with seemingly minimal
consequences. The lack of meaningful checks for 'policing' participants'
behavior risks misconduct or abuse in the ADR process and undermines ADR's
6. Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes 3
(3d ed. Aspen Law & Business 1999); Katherine V.W. Stone, Private Justice: The Law of Alternative
Dispute Resolution 34 (Foundation Press 2000); Zylstra, supra n. 5, at 71-76.
7. See Kovach, supra n. 5, at 593; Biller, supra n. 5, at 281.
8. Federal Magistrate Wayne Brazil identifies the following as "traditional litigation behavior":
self-conscious posturing; feigning emotions or states of mind; pressing arguments known or suspected
to be specious; concealing significant information; obscuring weaknesses; attempting to divert the
attention of other parties away from the main analytical or evidentiary chance; misleading others about
the existence or persuasive power of evidence not yet formally presented; resisting well-made
suggestions; intentionally injecting hostility or friction into the process; remaining rigidly attached to
positions not sincerely held; delaying other parties' access to information; or needlessly protracting the
proceedings. Brazil, supra n. 5, at 29.
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legitimacy or potential effectiveness." 9 Advocates of good faith requirements
posit that creating some common understanding of what behavior is expected or
acceptable would yield progress toward establishing a fairer environment. "In
order to maintain the integrity of the mediation process, the conduct of the
participants must be consistent with its goals and objectives."' 10 Proponents
express doubts that the special attributes of mediation, such as collaborative
problem solving, assisted-dialogue, reality testing, empowerment, flexibility, and
beneficial solutions can exist where good faith is absent."
Supporters argue that explicit good faith requirements in state mediation
statutes, court rules, and judicial orders inform parties of what is expected of them
by prescribing or proscribing conduct. "An objective standard of what constitutes
bad-faith participation in ADR should identify minimal aspects of good-faith
participation, or as a corollary, specify prohibited conduct ...to provide notice of
minimal aspects of good-faith participation."' 2  The most common types of
alleged bad faith behavior include failure to: attend the mediation; sign a mediated
agreement; make a suitable offer; send a representative with authority to settle;
provide documents; and failure to participate substantively or attempt to resolve
the case.' 3  Professor Kimberlee Kovach lists aspects of conduct that could
constitute elements of a good faith standard and proposes a model rule.'
4
Professor Maureen Weston proposes a "totality of the circumstances" test for
judging participation.' 5 She touts a statutory procedure with prohibited conduct,
procedural safeguards, remedies, and sanctions. 16
According to those who champion good faith requirements, the directives
would make the mediation process more efficient.' 7 Parties who appear without
requested documents, settlement authority, or a negotiating mind frame waste the
9. Weston, supra n. 5, at 604.
10. Kovach, supra n. 5, at 581.
11. Id. at 591.
12. Weston, supra n. 5, at 628.
13. Lande, supra n. 4, at 83-84 tbl.1.
14. Kovach, supra n. 5, at 622-23; Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins:
Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem
Solving: Mediation, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 935, 963-64 (2001) [hereinafter New Wine]:
[A]rriving at the mediation prepared with knowledge of the matter, in terms of both factual
background and possible solutions; having all necessary decision-makers present at the
mediation, not via telephone; taking into account the interests of the other parties; demonstrating
a willingness to listen and attempting to understand the position and interests of the other parties;
being prepared not only to discuss the issues and interests of your client, but also to listen to the
issues and interests of all other participants; engaging in open and frank discussions about the
case or matter in a way that might illuminate one's position for the other to know and understand
better; not lying when asked a specific and direct question; not intentionally misleading the other
side; having a willingness to discuss your position in detail; and explaining the rationale
underlying why a specific proposal is all that will be offered, or why one is refused. Good faith
also would include coming to the mediation with a willingness to be open to another perspective.
Parties do not agree with one another, but only attempt to understand the differing viewpoints
and, at the very least, not summarily and without consideration reject what the other party has to
say. And from the lawyer's perspective, an additional guideline may be appropriate, such as
allowing the client to discuss the matter directly with the other side and with the mediator.
Id.
15. Weston, supra n. 5, at 630.
16. Id. at 643-44.
17. Biller, supra n. 5, at 282.
20031
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time of other parties and the mediator. Unnecessary costs are incurred and
participants who act in good faith are harmed by those who do not. Allowing
mandatory mediation to include bad faith and inappropriate behavior erodes party
confidence and makes a mockery of the process.' Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc.
illustrates this point. 19 In that case the court-appointed mediator informed the trial
judge after the mediation of defense counsel's "minimal level of participation" by
failing to file a pre-mediation memorandum and appearing with only limited
authority.20 Two offers of settlement during the mediation were rejected.2 ' The
district court granted Nick's motion for sanctions for defendant's failure to
mediate in good faith and assessed the costs of mediation, attorneys' fees, and a
fine.2 The trial court determined that defendant failed to participate in good faith
and concluded that "[t]he consequence of Morgan's Foods' lack of good faith
participation in the ADR process, however, was the wasted expense of time and
energy of the Court, the neutral, Nick, and her court-appointed counsel., 23 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that appellant was
liable for its own and its counsel's failure to participate in good faith and "for
vexatiously increasing the costs of litigation by filing a frivolous motion for
reconsideration."24
To create the "bad faith-free" mediation environment envisioned, those
who favor the requirement urge that it must be enforceable. Enforcement of the
duty to participate in good faith should strike a balance between efficiency and
proportionality, avoiding "overkill" and guarding against settlement pressures.
25
Party conduct must be revealed and a determination must be made whether it
violates the demands of the requirement. Disclosure by the neutral of
communications and party conduct in mediation is the method of proof by which
bad faith often comes to light. Reports by mediators to the trial judge may recite
the substance of discussions as well as mediator impressions and conclusions
about party behavior and motivation.26 Proponents assert that misconduct must be
actionable and policies favoring confidentiality must be tempered to permit
disclosure of misconduct. To the extent that confidentiality is compromised, an
exception is warranted so the requirement will have significance. 27 "[T]he good-
faith-participation requirements applied to party conduct in ADR proceedings are
...designed to ensure process integrity and procedural fairness. The requirement is
18. Kovach, supra n. 5, at 596.
19. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D. Mo. App. 2000) (relying on the good faith requirement for pretrial
conferences in Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.), aff'd 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001)
20. Id. at 1058.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1059.
23. Id. at 1063.
24. Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 597 (8th Cir. 2001).
25. Andreas Nelle, Making Mediation Mandatory: A Proposed Framework, 7 Ohio St. J. on Dis.
Res. 287, 305 (1992) (cautioning that a good faith duty to participate "may create settlement
pressures").
26. See Foxgate Homeowners'Assn., Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 929 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist, 2000) (stating that "the report should be no more than a strictly neutral account of the
conduct and statements being reported, along with such other information as required to place those
matters in context"), superseded, 999 P.2d 666 (Cal. 2000), aff'd, 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).
27. Kovach, supra n. 5, at 585.
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essentially meaningless if confidentiality privileges restrict the ability to report
violations.
28
Advocates of good faith requirements acknowledge that impartiality of
the mediator would also be risked for the sake of enforcement. 29  "Permitting
disclosures for good-faith-violation claims also raises the concern that the role of
the third-party neutral is compromised where the neutral is a witness to the alleged
bad-faith ADR conduct.. .Neutrals have ethical as well as express and implied
contractual duties to be impartial and to maintain confidences imparted in an ADR
session... In some instances, however, a neutral may feel compelled to report party
misconduct in an ADR session."30 Proponents view the weakening of mediator
impartiality, whether it is real or merely perceived by the parties, as a trade-off for
the benefits of the requirements.
Supporters argue that post-mediation litigation to enforce the good faith
requirement is a necessary evil and small price to pay for a substantial payoff.
They assert that court-mandated mediation will be fairer and more efficient,
parties will have more confidence in the process, and the resulting settlements will
be the result of collaborative participation true to the goal of mediation. A
corollary result would be a change in the mindset of attorneys and parties in the
process from one of adversariness to one of cooperation. The alternative, in the
words of Professor Kovach, is that "[i]f good faith is not present, all we will be
left with is a pro forma mediation, one more procedural task to be checked off on
the long list of items to be covered in order to get to the trial."'
'
Those who favor good faith requirements contend that requiring parties
to adhere to a minimal standard of conduct adds to the legitimacy of the process.
"Sanction or liability would present a 'deterrent' to abuse power imbalances, yet
provide meaningful redress when such misconduct occurs. 3 2  Sanctions for
violations of a good faith requirement range from financial to substantive. They
may include costs, fees, expenses, fines, contempt, referral to arbitration, denial of
trial de novo, and dismissal with or without prejudice.3 3 Some statutes require
good faith but provide no sanctions for noncompliance.34 Where sanctions have
been imposed, parties have been ordered to pay fees and costs related to the
mediation and been subject to a contempt ruling. The mediator may terminate the
mediation. Procedural actions may attend such as referral to arbitration,
preclusion of one's day in court, and even dismissal.3 5 In Utah, state law permits
a temporary change in custody or visitation if a parent fails to cooperate in good
faith in mediation.
3 6
In short, these requirements are touted for their laudable objective of
addressing potential coercion, abuse, and bad faith behavior in mediation sessions.
"Despite difficult definitional and policy issues inherent in the enforcement of a
good-faith requirement, the legitimate objectives of ADR - including inter alia,
28. Weston, supra n. 5, at 633.
29. Kovach, supra n. 5, at 585.
30. Weston, supra n. 5, at 639-40.
31. Kovach, supra n. 5, at 595.
32. Weston, supra n. 5, at 643.
33. Id. at 632; Lande, supra n. 4, at 81.
34. Lande, supra n. 4, at 80-8 1.
35. Id. at 81.
36. Zylstra, supra n. 5, at 85; Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-38 (2002).
20031
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efficiency, effectiveness, party satisfaction, and fairness - require a duty of good
faith participation.
3 7
B. Arguments Against Good Faith Participation Requirements
The definitional problem with good faith requirements is a consistent and major
criticism. No clear definition exists of what constitutes good faith, or the lack
thereof, in mediation participation. 38  Good faith requirements suffer from
vagueness, lack clarity and consistency, and offer few guidelines to those who
must conform to or judge conduct. 39 A finding of bad faith is too often a purely
subjective assessment. Kovach concedes the indeterminacy of the standard but
asserts that "you know it when you see it.'4° The benefit of putting parties on
notice of expected behavior is lost when ambiguity exists in the concept of good
faith. "A requirement of 'good faith' participation, which is inherently vague and
subjective, unduly entrenches on the voluntariness of settlement and on the
parties' legitimate right to demand their day in court.' In defense, Kovach urges
that good faith does not mean having a sincere desire to reach resolution, being
"nice," full disclosure, honesty, or making offers or counteroffers.42 However, her
list of good faith conduct includes hard to grasp mandates such as "coming to the
mediation with a willingness to be open to another perspective.
' 43
Critics also point to the potential for misusing the good faith requirement,
such as threats to "tattle" to the mediator or judge, and frivolous complaints of bad
faith to intimidate the opposing party. The requirement has negative
consequences, converting the shield into a sword and diverting attention from the
true goals of the process. Rather than increasing dialogue, the requirement may
shut down constructive communication and chill some of the passionate and
useful exchange that can occur in mediation. Worse, it can induce dishonesty and
nurture an environment where bargaining is superficial and disingenuous.
"[F]ormalizing a requirement of 'good faith' participation might well have the
ironic effect of intensifying the temptations to 'litigize' mediation -- and thus to
corrupt its spirit and frustrate achievement of its potential." 44  Good faith
requirements arguably encourage more, not less, gamesmanship and posturing.
There is also the huge risk of inappropriate mediator conduct. Requiring the
mediator to determine when a party has not participated in good faith gives the
neutral tremendous power which may be abused for settlement pressure or to
make the mediator look good for the judge or court administration.
Good faith participation requirements may similarly lower a party's sense
of procedural fairness and expectation that the process is likely to end in a
settlement of choice. "The danger of this broad [good faith] formulation of the
37. Weston, supra n. 5, at 643.
38. Sherman, Court-Mandated, supra n. 5, at 2093; Winston, supra n. 5, at 198; Lande, supra n. 4,
at 77; Alfini, supra n. 5, at 65 (stating that lawyers believe requirement is too subjective).
39. Lande, supra n. 4, at 77; Devine, supra n. 5, at 108.
40. Kovach, supra n. 5, at 600.
41. Sherman, Aspirational, supra n. 5, at 14.
42. Kovach, New Wine, supra n. 14, at 962.
43. Kovach, supra n. 5, at 615.
44. Brazil, supra n. 5, at 33.
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duty to participate is that it may create settlement pressures, cutting back on the
essential voluntariness of agreement in mediation., 45  Public policy favoring
mediation is rooted in party choice, a position forcefully articulated in Decker v.
Lindsay.46 Trial Judge Lindsay ordered the Deckers to mediate their negligence
action against the real party in interest. 47  The court's Rules for Mediation
provided in pertinent part that "all parties commit to participate in the proceedings
in good faith with the intention to settle, if at all possible. 4 8 The appellate court
concluded that Judge Lindsay could not require the Deckers to negotiate in good
faith and attempt to reach a settlement.49 To do so would not be "consistent with a
scheme where a court refers a dispute to an ADR procedure.. .but no one can
compel the parties to negotiate or settle a dispute unless they voluntarily and
mutually agree to do so."50 Since the parties clearly indicated they wished to
proceed with trial (a simple case which would not last longer than 2 days), the
referral to mediation cannot require good faith negotiation.
51
Commentators contend that courts go too far in enforcing good faith
requirements.52 Sanctions that affect the party's right to progress along a litigation
route are troubling. Dean Edward Sherman argues that a fundamental principle of
ADR process legitimacy is that the proceeding not interfere with the party's rights
and trial strategy.53  Dean Sherman examined the phenomenon of court
institutionalization of ADR processes and measured five forms of participation
against four key principles: uncoerced settlement, fairness in the proceedings,
proceeding calculated to achieve its purpose, and respect for litigant autonomy.
He cautioned that:
too expansive a 'good faith participation' requirement may not be
compatible with ... principles underlying the values and objectives of
court-mandated ADR. ... [T]he higher the level of participation required,
the greater the coercion by forcing a party to present its case in a manner
not of its choosing. This shades into an invasion of litigant autonomy by
54
interfering with the party's choice of how to present its case.
In Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, Judge Anstead dissented from a denial of a
writ of certiorari, stating:
I would grant the petition which seeks to overturn a trial court order
sanctioning the petitioner for failing to send a representative to a
mediation proceeding with some authority to pay the respondent money
damages for his claim of wrongful discharge. The petitioner's lawyer
45. Nelle, supra n. 25, at 304.
46. 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App. 1992).
47. Id. at 248.
48. Id. at 249.
49. Id. at 252.
50. Id. at 251.
51. Id. at 252.
52. Tenerowicz, supra n. 5 (citing cases and cautioning that courts should be mindful of notice and
fairness concerns in applying sanctions).
53. Sherman, Court-Mandated, supra n. 5, at 2086-87.
54. Id. at 2094.
2003]
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and another representative appeared at the conference but were not
authorized to pay anything in settlement of the claim because the
petitioner adhered to a position that it was not liable to the claimant. I do
not believe the petitioner can be sanctioned for taking this stance at a
court-ordered mediation conference. To hold otherwise is to turn
mediation into a forced settlement proceeding .... [M]ediation is not
designed to force a settlement in any case 5W
The problem of creating attendant or "satellite" litigation flows from
enforcement. Critics analogize to the phenomenon of Rule 11 sanctions 56 which
triggered an "avalanche" of so-called "satellite litigation., 57 Clearly there has
been an increase in the number of reported "good faith" cases. Of 27 reported
cases dealing with bad faith, most were court-connected and only three were
decided before 1990; there have been 11 reported cases since 1998. 8 One could
expect a similar pattern in unreported cases. A survey of recent alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") case law revealed that one of the most frequently litigated
issues involved good faith requirements. 59  In two-thirds of the reported cases,
appellate courts reversed findings of bad faith by trial court. In contrast, five
cases were reported in which a trial court's rejection of bad faith claim were
appealed. All the trial court rulings were upheld on appeal.60 Weston concedes
that satellite litigation is an offshoot of good faith requirements, but asserts that it
61is warranted since the neutral cannot issue sanctions or impose penalties.
Good faith requirements have the unintended effect of immersing the
dispute deeper into the litigation stream, as seen in In Re Acceptance Ins. Co. 62 In
that case the trial court ordered the parties (insurance company and real party in
interest) to mediation before trial, specified that they must have representatives
present in person with full settlement authority, and ordered the parties "to make a
good faith effort to settle."63 Mediation was unsuccessful and the case went to
trial. 64 During the trial the court issued a second order of referral to mediation;
this mediation was also unsuccessful.65 A few days after the trial was finally
completed, the insurance company's counsel received a telephone call stating that
the trial court intended to conduct a sanctions hearing in three days. 66 At the
hearing the insurance company filed objections, asserting that no notice had been
provided and the proposed hearing violated mediation confidentiality. 67 The courtproceeded with the hearing and allowed opposing counsel to interrogate the
55. 525 S.2d 519, 519-20 (Fla. Dist. App. 1988).
56. Lande, supra n. 4, at 100.
57. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 589, 598 (1998) (citing
frequency of Rule 11 motions and threats of sanctions).
58. Lande, supra n. 4, at 82 n.54.
59. See Alfini & McCabe, supra n. 5, at 172.
60. Lande, supra n. 4, at 85.
61. Weston, supra n. 5, at 631.
62. 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App. 2nd Dist. 2000).




67. Id. at 447.
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insurance company's representative at length.68 She was asked about her
settlement authority, her preparation for mediation, her knowledge of matters in
the company's files, and communications with her supervisor by phone and with
opposing counsel during the mediation.69 When the hearing concluded, the trial
court set another hearing and ordered the senior vice president of the insurance
company to personally appear; the insurance company's counsel reasserted the
same objections to no avail.70 It then filed its petition for a writ of mandamus with
a request for an emergency stay.7' Notwithstanding the order, the real party in
interest filed a written motion for sanctions in the trial court against the insurance
company based on testimony obtained at the first sanctions hearing.72 Sanctions
were sought for the company's alleged failure to send a representative to
mediation with authority, failing to participate in mediation in good faith, and
failure to make a good faith effort to adhere to the trial court's mediation orders.73
In granting the writ, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the trial court had no
authority to inquire into or enforce its order requiring good faith negotiation,
citing the policy of the state "to encourage the peaceable resolution of
disputes...and the early settlement of pending litigation through voluntary
settlement procedures.. .a court may compel parties to participate in ... mediation,
but it cannot compel them to negotiate in good faith or to settle their dispute.,
74
The trial court improperly allowed inquiry into communications made by a
participant relating to the subject matter of the mediation which were confidential,
not subject to disclosure, and could not be used as evidence against the participant
in any judicial or administrative proceeding.75 The manner in which parties
negotiate should not be disclosed to the trial court.76
Finally, some would argue that good faith requirements are overreactions
to a numerically small number of incidents.77 Little evidence exists that there is a
significant problem with "bad faith" participation in mediation. Interviews with
mediators in one jurisdiction showed that they believe the problem is over-
stated. 78 For egregiously bad conduct in mediation, good faith requirements are
unnecessary.
Given...the elusiveness of the concept of 'good faith' itself, courts are
likely to feel confident that a party has violated a requirement to proceed
in 'good faith' only when the offender's conduct is extreme ... . But







74. Id. at 451 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 452-53.
76. Id. at 452.
77. Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?, 18 Ohio St.
J. on Disp. Resol. 93, 142 (2002) (arguing that court ADR programs fall short of their intended goals).
78. Alfini, supra n. 5, at 65.
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impose an appropriate sanction without resort to any 'good faith'
requirement.
79
These requirements run counter to important public policy considerations favoring
confidentiality in mediation and voluntary settlements created by parties without
judicial pressure. Critics cite their counterproductive effect, namely that "there is
a substantial risk that imposing a good faith requirement would tend to defeat the
goal of encouraging the more open, cooperative, and constructive participation
that deserves the label 'good faith'. 8 °
Goals of efficiency and cost-effectiveness may also be elusive. Professor
John Lande points out that "[tihe time, expense, and uncertainty of appeal can be
substantial and in most cases probably must be greater than the costs involved in a
mediation 'wasted' due to bad faith."'8 From the perspective of a lawyer-
advocate:
People have many motivations to mediate, some purer than others. A
determination of good faith is nearly impossible. Sometimes parties
initially agree to mediate for dubious reasons -- free discovery or the
opportunity to intimidate the other party. Even then, however, there are
many instances where, once in mediation, they do effectively negotiate
an agreement. For the most part good faith is not a requirement for
mediation. If there is bad faith, it will become evident soon enough and
all that will be lost is some time and money.8
2
The deleterious effect of a good faith requirement on the mediation
process, underlying dispute, parties, mediator, and court system is perhaps best
83illustrated by the long and drawn out case of Foxgate v. Bramalea. In a
construction defect suit, the court-appointed mediator ordered the parties to bring
their experts to the mediation and make their best effort to cooperate in the
mediation process.84 When defense counsel showed up late without any experts
the mediation went forward but was cancelled after the mediator concluded that
they could not proceed. Plaintiff filed a motion alleging failure to cooperate in
mediation, seeking as sanctions the cost to plaintiff for its counsel's preparation
for mediation, the cost to plaintiff of nine experts' time for preparation and
appearance at the mediation, and payment to the mediator. 86 The motion was
accompanied by the plaintiff's declaration describing defense counsel's actions
and statements that were allegedly indicative of a pattern of tactics pursued in bad
87faith. The mediator filed a report to the trial court reciting defense counsel's
actions and statements during the mediation and characterized them as
79. Brazil, supra n. 5, at 31.
80. Brazil, supra n. 5, at 33.
81. Lande, supra n. 4, at 86, n.77.
82. Robert D. Benjamin, Considering Mediation What Lawyers and Clients Should Know, 18 No. 7
GPSolo 28, 34-5 (2001).
83. Foxgate, 25 P.3d 1117.
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"obstructive bad faith tactics., 88  The mediator's report also included
recommendations for further mediation sessions and his resignation.
89
Bramalea and its counsel, Mr. Stevenson, opposed the sanctions motion
on numerous grounds and objected to the mediator's report, giving its own version
of events during mediation.90 The trial court denied the motion without prejudice
and ordered more mediation with a new mediator. 91 The new mediator advised
the court after one session that further mediation would not be constructive.
92
Bramalea filed a motion seeking return of mediation fees paid to the first
mediator, claiming that he was biased and condemning the manner in which he
conducted the mediation. 93 In his defense, the mediator filed a declaration stating
that Stevenson aborted the mediation by refusing to participate in good faith.94
Foxgate filed a new motion for increased sanctions. 95 In its opposition to this
second motion for sanctions, Bramalea argued for the first time that the mediator's
report and other disclosures about the mediation are inadmissible in light of
statutory provisions stating: "Neither a mediator nor anyone else may submit to a
court.. .and a court... may not consider, any report, assessment, evaluation,
recommendation, or finding of any kind by the mediator concerning a mediation
conducted by the mediator..."96 Plaintiff's second sanctions motion was granted.97
On appeal, Bramalea contended that the superior court violated
mediation confidentiality by considering the mediator's report.98 The California
Court of Appeals reversed the sanctions order because the trial court failed to
recite in detail the conduct justifying the order.99 However, the court of appeals
rejected appellant's argument that the mediator was barred from reporting conduct
during the mediation to the court.1°°  Acknowledging that the purpose of
confidentiality "is to promote mediation and that confidentiality is essential to
mediation," the appellate court concluded that the Legislature "did not intend
statutory mandated confidentiality to create an immunity from sanctions that
would shield parties who disobey valid orders governing the parties'
participation. "' '  The court of appeals created an exception to mediation
confidentiality; it described the exception as narrow, permitting a mediator or
party to report to the court only information that is reasonably necessary to
describe sanctionable conduct and place that conduct in context.l°0
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and
held that "[tihe statutes are clear. Section 1119 [on confidentiality] prohibits any
person, mediator and participants alike, from revealing any written or oral
88. Id. at 1121.
89. Id. at 1121, n.4.
90. Id. at 1121.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1121-22.








102. Id. at 1123.
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communication made during mediation. Section 1121 also prohibits the mediator,
but not a party, from advising the court about conduct during mediation that might
warrant sanctions."'' 0 3 The court reaffirmed that "confidentiality is essential to
effective mediation." Litigation over the application of a good faith requirement
in this dispute consumed over four years.4
III. GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENTS UNDERMINE KEY MEDIATION VALUES
More is at stake with these good faith requirements than debates over
definitions and crowded dockets. Core characteristics of the mediation process
are weakened and larger values are threatened. These essential values are party
self-determination, mediator impartiality, and mediation confidentiality.
Mediation values, not litigation values, ought to be the yardstick by which all
mediation rules and standards are measured. When judged against these most
basic mediation values, good faith requirements are undesirable and, moreover,
destructive to the mediation process.
A. Party Self-determination
The first special power of mediation, and what some call '[t]he
overriding feature...and value of mediation', is that 'it is a consensual
process that seeks self-determined resolutions.' Mediation places the
substantive outcome of the dispute within the control and determination
of the parties themselves; it frees them from relying on or being subject
to the opinions and standards of outside 'higher authorities', legal or
otherwise. 105
Self-determination is the key principle of mediation that places
settlement power solely with the parties1 ° 6  The premise underlying self-
determination is that the parties are happier with and more likely to honor an
agreement they voluntarily choose to create.' 0 7  Placing the decision making
power with the parties instead of a judge is a vital aspect of mediation's
attractiveness and success as a dispute resolution process. As a disputant-centered
process, mediation allows parties to "control the substantive norms guiding their
discussion and decision-making ... and control the final outcome of the dispute
103. Id. at 1125.
104. Id. at 1117.
105. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The
Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 253, 267 (1989) (advocating that
mediator standards should draw from the traditional theory of the mediation process and the mediator's
role).
106. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Standard I (1994).
The Standards of Conduct for Mediators begin:
Self-Determination: A Mediator Shall Recognize that Mediation is Based on the Principle of
Self-Determination by the Parties.
107. Alan Scott Rau et al., Mediation and Other Non-Binding ADR Processes 12 (2d ed. 2002); Frank
E. A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 1, 13-14
(1985).
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resolution process. ' ° 8  Mediation allows the parties to structure the process,
define the issues, determine what is needed to resolve the issues, and, by engaging
in the process, to handle disputes better in the future. Thus, mediation, unlike
litigation, is said to empower disputants. 109
In the mediation process, the parties design their preferred resolution to
the dispute and determine what information, principles, and terms are relevant to
reach that end. The malleability of the resolution process allows parties to paint a
more complete picture of the situation than would a rigid dispute resolution
process governed by evidence and procedural rules. " "The good faith
requirements represent an attempt by the courts to create maximum efficiency of a
system that is designed to protect the parties' rights to self-determination
regarding the discussion of issues and settlement. Such divergent goals cannot
coexist without one of these forces weakening the power of the other." ' Good
faith, it is argued, does not mean an agreement must be achieved.1 2  Yet it is
clear that good faith requirements curtail the uninhibited give-and-take of
facilitated negotiation that occurs in mediation. Parties must be mindful of their
behavior knowing that mediators necessarily evaluate the settlement dynamics
they witness in the process. Good faith requirements exert subtle but undue
pressure on parties in presenting and resolving their cases.
13
The National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs
[hereafter "Standards"], published in 1992, were developed to guide courts in
initiating, expanding, or improving mediation programs to which they refer
cases.1 14 The goal of the Standards was to inspire court-connected mediation
programs of high quality. The Standards advise that "Courts should impose
mandatory attendance only when ...there is no inappropriate pressure to settle, in
the form of reports to the trier of fact or financial disincentives to trial."1 5
Similarly, under the heading "Inappropriate Pressure to Settle," the Standards state
that "[c]ourts should institute appropriate provisions to permit parties to opt out of
mediation... There should be no adverse response by courts to nonsettlement by
the parties in mediation."' 
16
Concurrently, the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(SPIDR) issued a report entitled "Mandated Participation and Settlement
Coercion." 1 7 The report, a nineteen month effort by a committee of academics,
practitioners, program directors, and social science researchers cautioned that
108. Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (2001) (arguing that self-
determination is increasingly diluted in court-connected mediation).
109. Bush, supra, n. 105, at 267.
110. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Ohio St. L. J. 29, 34 (1982).
111. Zylstra, supra n. 5, at 70.
112. Kovach, New Wine, supra n. 14, at 961.
113. Sherman, Court-Mandated, supra n. 5, at 2094; Zylstra, supra n. 5, at 93-94.
114. Center for Dispute Settlement, The Institute of Judicial Administration, National Standards for
Court-Connected Mediation Programs, (a joint project of the Center for Dispute Settlement and The
Institute for Judicial Administration). It won the Center for Public Resources Legal Program Award
for "Excellence in ADR" in 1992.
115. Id. at 5.1(b).
116. Id. at 11.1 and 11.2, pp. 9-10.
117. Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Dispute Resolution as it Relates to the Courts:
Mandated Participation and Settlement Coercion, 46 Arb. J. No. 1, at 38, 40 (1991).
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mandatory dispute resolution could create coercive pressure on parties to settle.
One of these pressures specifically noted was reports to the trier of fact. The
SPIDR report distinguished situations where parties who are required to
participate are not penalized for failing to agree with or to accept the
recommendation of the neutral third party.' 1 8 However, it cited some jurisdictions
where "a party rejecting the advice of the third party neutral concerning settlement
may risk financial penalties or the communication of that advice to the trier of
fact."" 9 This latter situation is considered settlement coercion.
Clearly, rules dictating behavior in a mandated process create even more
issues regarding settlement coercion. The fear of having confidential
communications with the mediator revealed to the judge, the likelihood of
economic sanctions, the potential for an adversarial proceeding on the content of
mediation sessions, and the possibility of strategic disadvantage are pressures that
accompany enforcement of a good faith requirement. In Bennett v. Bennett,120 the
court refused to look back into the mediation process because it would:
...require -the trial court to engage in the time-consuming process of
exploring what transpired between the parties during the course of the
mediation in order to determine if they had reached an agreement and, if
so, the actual terms of the agreement. This is contrary to and would
undermine the basic policy of the mediation process that parties be
encouraged to arrive at a settlement of disputed issues without the
intervention of the court.'
2
1
The thought of heavy-handed mediators using good faith sanctions to
pressure parties into making agreements is alarming. 22 Even the most ethical and
cautious mediators, however, could create an environment that puts pressure on
parties to settle because their role as neutral includes being a monitor of good faith
behavior.
Mediators who know that the law requires the parties to participate in
'good faith' are more likely to worry about whether they have a duty to
report, on their own initiative a violation of that duty...[a]pprehension
about such duties or pressures could create counterproductive distractions




The Standards of Conduct for Mediators provide:
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 587 A.2d 463 (Me. 1991).
121. Id. at 464.
122. Lande, supra n. 4, at 107.
123. Brazil, supra n. 5, at 32.
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II. Impartiality: A Mediator Shall Conduct the Mediation in an
Impartial Manner.
The concept of mediator impartiality is central to the mediation process.
A mediator shall mediate only those matters in which she or he remains
impartial and evenhanded. If at any time the mediator is unable to
conduct the process in an impartial manner, the mediator is obligated to
withdraw. 124
Mediator neutrality is a fundamental aspect of mediation. The neutral's
role is limited to informing parties about the process, facilitating discussion, and
assisting in option development to resolve the dispute. 25 Erosion of mediator
impartiality and loss of trust in the mediator would result from a good faith
requirement.126 Kovach concedes that "[t]he mediator's role, as impartial, and in
maintaining all confidences of the proceeding, may have to be compromised in
order to implement a good faith requirement with substance. ' ' 27  Citing the
incompatibility between being a judge and mediator, Judge Wayne Brazil notes
that a "duty to pass judgment would threaten a core component of the [mediator's]
sense of professional self - a sense at the center of which is a vision of 'neutrality'
built around the notion that a facilitative mediator is never to express a normative
or analytical critique.'
128
Good faith requirements create counterproductive distractions which
distort the ways in which parties and counsel interact with the mediator. If they
feel they are being evaluated, the participants may try to manipulate the mediator
in an attempt to turn the mediator into their agent. 129 "They will also feel tempted
to 'perform' for her. To the extent that they feel fear and a compulsion to
perform, they are also less likely to... trust the process and the person at its
center.' 30 Speaking of the family law context, one critic noted: "[b]y removing
the mediator from the role of the neutral and into the decision maker [to decide if
good faith is breached], the process strikingly resembles an adversarial process
where the parties attempt to convince a trier of their benevolence. Such a
contortion of the mediation process within custody disputes negates the goal of
cooperation and collaborative problem solving to assist parents in working
together in the future to resolve issues concerning child-rearing."'' If the
mediator is in a position to effect outcome, parties would try to advocate to the
mediator to win her favor, subverting the honest, constructive dialogue the
mediator is trying to establish.
The quality of the mediation process is dependent on the participants'
confidence in the mediator's impartiality.132 Mediators must not allow party
performance during the mediation, personal bias, or other factors to cause the
124. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Stand. 1 (1994).
125. Id.
126. Zylstra, supra n. 5, at 96-97.
127. Kovach, supra n. 5, at 585.
128. Brazil, supra n. 5, at 32.
129. Brazil, supra n. 77, at 143.
130. Brazil, supra n. 5, at 32.
131. Zystra, supra n. 5, at 96.
132. Goldberg, supra n. 6, at 652.
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mediator to become impartial. 33 The mediator must facilitate discussion without
showing favoritism for a particular party, and the parties are the ultimate judges of
mediator neutrality.' 34  "Mediators are advocates for a fair process and not a
particular settlement."'1 35 Mediator neutrality would be illusory if there is an
indication that the mediator favors a particular position.136 "Freedom from even a
hint of bias is so important both to public confidence and to the productivity of a
mediation program that we must try not to overlook any aspect of a program that




Confidentiality of communications and actions during mediation is
essential to the process.' 38 The appearance of mediator neutrality is dependent on
the protection of confidentiality. The neutrality of the mediator and process are
most certainly called into question if a mediator is forced to testify about the
behavior and statements of a party during mediation. 139 Because the parties
expect that their communications will remain confidential and that the mediator
will not discuss these communications outside of the mediation, exceptions to the
mediator privilege against testifying betray these expectations. "Perhaps the most
critical effect a good faith requirement has on the mediation process is its effect on
confidentiality."'
' 40
Sharing information that might allow an opposing party to glimpse one's
vulnerabilities is risky and counterintuitive in negotiation. Confidentiality allows
the parties to reveal secrets and their most personal feelings about the conflict that
might otherwise not be disclosed in an adversarial setting. Because of this, "in
many mediations, confidentiality does far more than enhance the candid nature of
the discussion; between some adversaries, confidentiality may be akin to a
precondition for any discussion.'' In addition, the protection of confidentiality is
crucial if the mediator is to learn the various complexities involved in the dispute
so that she may aid the parties in arriving at an agreed upon solution.
Confidentiality builds a relationship of trust and understanding between
the mediator and the parties that enables the mediator to facilitate an open
discussion. Once the mediator establishes this relationship, the parties more
willingly accept guidance from the mediator and can turn to collaborating about
133. Goldberg, supra n. 6, at 652-53.
134. Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict 52
(2d ed., Jossey - Bass 1996).
135. Id.
136. Stone, supra n. 6, at 42.
137. Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for Delivery of ADR Services by the Courts: Critical
Values and Concerns, 14 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 715, 743 (1999).
138. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Stand. IV (1994) Confidentiality: A Mediator Shall
Maintain the Reasonable Expectations of the Parties with Regard to Confidentiality.
139. Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: to The Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 Marq. L.
Rev. 8, 70 (2001) (arguing that the UMA goes too far in protecting confidentiality).
140. Alfini & McCabe, supra n. 5, at 194.
141. Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or
Crucial Reliability?, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 79, 82 (2001).
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possible solutions. The parties also rely on this protection when participating in
private caucuses. A private caucus allows the mediator insight into the thoughts,
interests, and motivations of a particular party outside the presence of the
opposing party. Although the information discussed in the caucus will not be
revealed without permission, the mediator will use this information to move the
mediation forward, such as brainstorming possible solutions with both parties. 1
42
The National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs advise
courts to "have clear written policies relating to the confidentiality of both written
and oral communications in mediation," recognizing that "the mediators and cases
[are] protected by confidentiality," and that "[m]ediators should not make
recommendations regarding the substance or recommended outcome of a case to
the court.' ' 143 In a section specifically dealing with communications between
mediators and the court, the Standards provide:
12.1 During a mediation the judge or other trier of fact should be
informed only of the following:
a. the failure of a party to comply with the order to attend mediation;
b. any request by the parties for additional time to complete the
mediation;
c. if all parties agree, any procedural action by the court that would
facilitate the mediation; and
d. the mediator's assessment that the case is inappropriate for
mediation. 144
12.2 When the mediation has been concluded, the court should be
informed of the following:
a. If the parties do not reach an agreement on any matter, the mediator
should report the lack of an agreement to the court without comment or
recommendation.
b. If agreement is reached, any requirement that its terms be reported to
the court should be consistent with the jurisdiction's policies governing
settlements in general. -
c. With the consent of the parties, the mediator's report also may
identify any pending motions or outstanding legal issues, discovery
142. Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305, 318, 325-326 (1971).
143. Center for Dispute Settlement, supra n. 114, at § § 9.la, 9.4. Commentary adds, "[i]n weighing
the benefits of confidentiality protections against the potential costs of nondisclosure of information in
order to determine their policies regarding confidentiality, courts should take care to preserve the
integrity of the mediation process." Id. at § 9.1, 9-2.
144. Id. at § 12.1, 12-1.
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process, or other action by party which, if resolved or completed, would
facilitate the possibility of a settlement.1
45
Commentary to 12.1 discusses harm to the mediation process where a mediator
makes recommendations or gives evaluations to the judge who may be involved in
a trial if the case does not settle. It specifically points out that a "problem exists
where a statute or court rule requires parties to make a 'good faith' effort to
mediate."' 146 Commentary to 12.2 states: "These Standards reject the approach of
those who propose extensive communications between the mediator and the judge
after a mediation in which settlement is not reached."'
147
Without the promise of confidentiality, parties would half-heartedly
participate in mediation for fear that an unsuccessful mediation would leave the
opposing party free to divulge information in subsequent legal proceedings. The
public places great trust in the confidentiality protection mediation provides, and
by compromising this protection participation in mediation will decrease.
4 8
Confidentiality is necessary to explore settlement options, and a lack or breach of
confidentiality "limits the efficacy and the efficiency of mediation.' 49  A
mediation session is beneficial in that it gives participants a forum to express
themselves while preventing future disagreements that would have arisen had the
discussion focused solely on the surface problem between the parties. 50 Without
the protection of confidentiality parties are less likely to participate and will be
less forthcoming in mediation.' 5' Even the most earnest proponent acknowledges
that "[a]fter-the-fact allegations of ADR bad-faith conduct can undermine
participants' trust in the confidentiality of ADR, create uncertainty, and
potentially impair full use of the process."'' 52  To summarize, the difficulties of
communicating with an adversary, the intervention of a neutral third party, and the
potential for information to reach a judge are triple considerations that make
confidentiality especially important in mediation. 153
The three core values of self-determination, mediator neutrality, and
confidentiality are interdependent qualities that define mediation as it was
originally envisioned and gave rise to the promise of mediation as a distinct
alternative to adjudication. These values are integral to the legitimacy of
mediation as a consensual, flexible, creative, party-driven process to resolve
disputes. In an exhortation on threats to ADR process integrity and quality
control, Judge Brazil cautioned:
145. Id. at §12.2, 12-3.
146. Id.
147. Id. at § 12.2, 12.4.
148. Alan Kirtley, supra n. 5, at 9-10.
149. Hughes, supra n. 139, at 70.
150. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 121 (1976).
151. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers
From the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 407, 436 (1997)
(analyzing the way in which legal ethical rules are incompatible with the values of ADR and the roles
played in ADR).
152. Weston, supra n. 5, at 633.
153. Deason, supra n. 141, at 83-84.
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[W]e must vigilantly protect the neutrals who serve in our programs from
role distorting pressures ... for example, we must be sensitive to the
confidentiality promises that attend most ADR processes ... and we must
discipline ourselves, as judges, not to press or permit our neutrals to
make unauthorized, inappropriate disclosures to us of communications
that were made or developments that occurred in our ADR
processes.. .Even more fundamentally, we must protect our neutrals from
feeling pressure to 'get the cases settled'. 154
IV. FACTORS IN CHOOSING AMONG DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES
In making the choice to utilize the court system, the disputing parties are
saying something about the nature or character of their dispute. As part of this
discussion of the benefits and risks of a good faith requirement report by the
mediator, it is useful to determine what criteria the parties may be using, even if
indirectly or unconsciously. The application of such criteria suggests that parties,
in making a process selection, subscribe to the standards and attributes of their
chosen process. By identifying the process selection factors, we can compare
value choices as well. This section provides a bridge as we move from an
exposition of mediation values to a discussion of legal values. A study done in
1984155 (hereafter "Report") of the role of the courts in American society
attempted to provide a way to engage in the inquiry. The Report outlines a
number of criteria in determining what kinds of matters are appropriate for the
courts and the types that may be more appropriately disposed of in another forum.
The Report groups the criteria into two categories: (1) functional criteria; and (2)
prudential criteria. 56
The Report defines functional criteria as including "those factors that
make a court peculiarly suited (or unsuited) to hear the matter in controversy....
[That is] whether the court, as a particular type of governmental institution, is
competent to hear and determine the dispute."' 7 The use of the word
"competence" in the context of this discussion does not include the traditional
concept of the "power or the authority of the court to act" as defined by some
constitutional mandate or a statutory grant of power by a legislative body.'
5 8
Included in the functional criteria are: (1) objectivity; (2) necessity for
authoritative standards; and (3) determining past vs. future events. 59 The
154. Brazil, supra n. 5, at 26.
155. The Role of Courts in American Society: Final Report of the Council on the Role of Courts
(Jethro K. Lieberman prin. ed., West 1984).
156. Id. at 102.
157. Id.
158. For example, the Constitution vests the federal judicial power in a Supreme Court and in lower
courts that Congress chooses to create. U.S. Const. Art. HI, § 1. The Congress has the power to
"constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." U.S. Const. Art. III, § 8. The states too have
certain courts that are created by their state's constitution, usually defined as the courts of general
jurisdiction. The state legislature also creates other courts with limited jurisdiction which means that
the court may not hear a matter in controversy in excess of a certain amount. The competence of the
lesser court may be limited by its subject matter.
159. The Role of Courts in American Society, supra n. 155, at 102-08.
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element of "objectivity" is relatively clear. The question to be asked is whether the
dispute demands "detached objectivity."' 60 The Report explains:
[I]ndependence and impartiality are hallmarks of courts, and party
participation in giving proof and making arguments are basic attributes of
the judicial process that courts employ .... These in turn give integrity
and respect to judicial decisions. When it is important for the decision to
have the kind of integrity that the nature of the court and its process
impart, the court is the proper forum. This criterion of objectivity surely
applies in life-and-death cases, in constitutional claims, and in cases
where liberty is at stake. It may or may not apply in cases turning on a
dispute over a sum of money.'
61
The second element in determining the competency of the court to hear
the dispute is that of the necessity for authoritative standards.' 62 The question to
be asked is: "Can authoritative and ascertainable standards be applied to the facts
of the dispute to produce a principled resolution?"' 163 As the Report notes, this
element is a determination of degree.164 On the one hand an authoritative standard
may be as precise as the period within which a claim of discrimination must be
filed with an enforcement agency. It may also be subject to interpretation. The
Report also notes that not every standard that can be applied by a person
necessarily means that the dispute is one which is appropriate for adjudication by
a court.'16  For example, a sensei in a dojo, no doubt, can articulate a standard
which her/his students must meet in order to qualify for promotion to the various
degrees of black belt. That standard, however, cannot be stated in such precise
terms that one can say that one movement in response to an attack is objectively
wrong while another is objectively correct. The court's involvement in such a
dispute would involve it in intractable issues of judgment without the ability to
establish a sufficiently objective and widely accepted set of principles by which
the integrity of its decision could be measured. 1
66
The third element requires assessing whether the dispute requires "the
reconstruction of past events or the determination of existing factual
circumstances, as distinguished from efforts to forecast future events or design
160. Id. at 102.
161. Id. at 102-03.
162. Id. at 103.
163. Id. at 103.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Lon Fuller refers to certain disputes as being polycentric because they are "many centered" each
crossing of strands is a distinct center for distributing tensions. He analogizes polycentric situation
with a spider web. "A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout
the web as a whole." The Forms and Limits of Adjudication 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 395 (1978). He
emphasizes that the question of whether a dispute is polycentric is not an all or nothing question. The
significant determination is whether the polycentric elements of the problem have become so
predominant that it makes adjudication inappropriate. Adjudication becomes inappropriate because the
dispute is no longer one in which the problem can be resolved by the application of an authoritative
standard and the mode of participation in the resolution of the problem is not through proof and
reasoned arguments. Id.
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future courses of conduct." 167  This essentially involves the role of the court in
deciding the case or controversy based upon the facts as presented by the
adversaries to the dispute. There are few, if any, cases, which involve only the
resolution of the factual situation presented to the court. In deciding the case
before it, the court also devises a legal principle or doctrine which will affect the
way in which people, who are in similar situations, will structure their behavior.
Indeed, the resolution of the case involves the court in the establishment of some
sort of public policy. The key question here is whether the dispute before the
court predominantly involves the evaluation of past events and their consistency
or inconsistency with some applicable legal principle. If so, the method of
decision-making is through the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments by
the parties to the dispute. Under such circumstances, the court is clearly
competent to entertain and to resolve the dispute. 168
Where the predominant inquiry, however, is one which requires the
forecasting of future events and the appropriate institutional response or behavior
that should accompany the occurrence of an event, the use of the court process is
more problematic. Future events are probabilities with a plethora of possible
reactions to the events. The rules of procedure of the court are designed to require
the parties to state their claim and response to a claim based upon what already
has happened and, to some extent, those events are fixed in time. The rules of
discovery permit the parties to probe one another as to what they did in the past
and not what they may contemplate doing in the future.
Prudential criteria are defined as "those factors that make a court more or
less suited than other institutions to hearing and resolving a dispute [assuming
that] the court is competent to adjudicate the issue in controversy." 169 The
prudential criteria include: (1) costs; (2) particularized consideration; (3)
preference of the parties; (4) vitality of another institution; (5) immediate
resolution of a specialized problem; and (6) direct vs. indirect action. 170 The first
element of cost requires an assessment of the relationship between the cost of
resolving the dispute in the courts in relation to the amount at stake.' 7' Where the
cost of adjudication is disproportionately high in comparison with the amount in
controversy, the use of the courts to resolve the dispute must be seriously
questioned. Clearly, the element of cost as a factor will come into play most often
where the dispute is over a monetary claim as opposed to a claim involving a
significant statutory issue or a question of constitutional interpretation.
167. The Role of Courts in American Society, supra n. 155, at 105.
168. Those who criticize the courts in the monitoring of institutions (e.g., prisons or mental health
hospitals) note that "[tihere is a tension between two different judicial responsibilities: deciding the
particular case and formulating a general policy. Two different kinds of fact-finding processes are
required for these two different functions. The adversary system of presentation and rules of evidence
were both developed for the former, and they leave much to be desired for the latter." Id. at 105
(footnote omitted). Critics of the courts in such monitoring roles emphasize that the court's processes
are ill-equipped to develop the kind of social facts (sometimes denoted as legislative facts) necessary
for the formulation of policies for future activities of an institution. Future events are the stuff of
probability, and the procedures and the processes are best equipped to assist the court, through the
efforts of the parties to the dispute, in determining what happened rather than what should happen in
the future. Id. at 105-06.
169. Id. at 108.
170. Id. at 108-12.
171. Id. at 108.
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The second prudential criterion is that of particularized consideration.
172
Here, the question is whether the case "present[s] only repetitive kinds of factual
or administrative questions not calling for particularized consideration of legal
issues in each case."' 73 For example, the court may have entered a consent decree
in a discrimination dispute. The terms of the decree may set forth the principles
under which some claimants in the class are entitled to more than that to which
was agreed. It would be a waste of the court's resources to hear numerous
individual claims of entitlement beyond what was provided for in the decree.
Most, if not all of these individual claims, would require no consideration of facts
or law which were not addressed in the court's decision to approve the decree.
The court's assessment of each of these individual and largely routine or repetitive
issues would not be an efficient use of the court's time. A program, in which such
claims are brought before an arbitrator or resolved in mediation, might be a far
more appropriate way to dispose of the individual claims.
The preference of the parties is a third element to be considered. 74 The
task is to determine whether a more sound resolution of the controversy would "be
achieved through a process giving effect to the parties' preferences rather than
through the imposition of a third-party judgment." 175 Obviously, mediation rather
than adjudication would permit the parties' preference to take precedence in the
resolution of such disputes. In a mediation it would be the parties who would be
able to define what facts are relevant in resolving their dispute.
The fourth inquiry under the prudential considerations is whether the
action by the court will likely impair the vitality of another institution.176 "When a
decision would closely affect the continued vitality of another valued institution --
a family, a school, a private political party -- a court should supplant the
traditional decision maker only in compelling cases."' 77 One example from the
Report of such a dispute would be the setting of academic standards. The faculty
of a law school, for example, should be permitted to establish what the course of
study should be to qualify for graduation. Indeed, it should be able to establish
the standard of performance necessary for a student to be deemed to have
satisfactorily completed her/his course of study. The faculty and the




175. Id. Fuller, in his still timely article, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, gives the example of
a wealthy person who dies and leaves, "in equal shares," her valuable collection of paintings to the
Metropolitan Museum and the National Gallery. The will, however, indicates no particular
apportionment.
[The] problem of effecting an equal division of the paintings [is an example of a polycentric
task.] [Tihe disposition of any single painting has implications for the proper disposition of every
other painting. If [the Metropolitan] gets the Renoir, the Gallery may be less eager for the
CUzanne but all the more eager for the Bellows, etc. If the proper apportionment were set for
argument, there would be no clear issue to which either side could direct its proofs and
contentions. Any judge assigned to hear such an argument would be tempted to assume the role
of mediator or to adopt the classical solution: Let the older brother (here the Metropolitan)
divide the estate into what he regards equal shares, let the younger brother (the National Gallery)
take his pick.
Supra n. 58, at 394.
176. Lieberman, supra note 153, at 109
177. Id.
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determinations. Provided that the decisions of such institutions are rational, the
institution should be free from interference from other non-educational bodies or
tribunals.
A fifth area of inquiry is to determine if the dispute involves the
immediate resolution of a specialized problem.178 That is: "Is the controversy one
that arises in a specialized area when an immediate, on-the-spot decision that must
be final is necessary? ' ,' 79 An example is one in which a legitimate question arises
as to the safety of a specified plant operation which is called to management's
attention by the union. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the union has
the right to order its members to cease work in an environment that the union
considers dangerous to its members' health. The management contends that such
a cessation of work would be an illegal work stoppage. The issue is justiciable,
but the court is clearly not the best forum in which to have this dispute resolved.
The court does not have the immediate expertise to make a judgment about the
operation. Nor can the court make an immediate on-the-scene inspection. The
court would have to wait for proof to be presented in order for it to make a
reasonably accurate decision. The parties' need for an immediate resolution to
prevent physical harm or to avert an unnecessary work stoppage would be lost if
the court were called upon to resolve the matter. On the other hand, a third-party
neutral, perhaps with the power of an arbitrator with years of experience in that
particular industry, could be on the scene within a few hours. In doing so, she
could inspect the operation, hear the contentions of the parties at the work site,
and make a decision on the spot or very shortly thereafter.
The final prudential consideration is whether resolution of the dispute
calls for direct vs. indirect action. 180 "If a court is not the best institution to decide
the case directly, can it nevertheless be helpful in hastening a resolution?, 181 The
court is uniquely poised to spur settlement between the parties by holding out to
both the specter of the ruling. It can also decide various procedural issues which
may affect the outcome of any trial that may take place. As is often the case today
in class action discrimination cases, the court can establish the process whereby
non-court agencies or processes can decide controversies.
82
By choosing to file a lawsuit, the parties to a dispute subscribe to certain
standards of expected behavior and expectations in outcome as they participate in
the adjudicative process. 183 These are reflected in the functional and prudential
factors described above. What does their choice of a public court forum say about
the values that should govern their actions and resulting resolution of their
dispute? If, as part of their court case, the dispute is referred to mediation, how
do those legal values interact with the values of the mediation process?




182. See e.g. Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1998). In this matter, the plaintiffs were
African American farmers who claimed that they had been discriminated against by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) in the consideration for loans from various programs administered
by the USDA. The consent decree entered into by the parties provides for the arbitration of certain
disputes that remain unresolved following the decree.
183. See Sherman, supra n. 5.
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V. LEGAL VALUES AND THEIR THREAT To THE MEDIATION PROCESS
As the forum comparison factors above suggest, the election to resolve a
dispute through the court system implies that the parties are prepared to embrace
certain qualities of the legal system and the court process. These qualities include
objectivity, authoritative standards, and a determination of past events. They also
include assessing the cost implications, the need for particularized consideration
of legal issues, the relative speed of resolution of a specialized problem, and the
desirability of direct action by the court.
By funneling these court cases into a mediation stream, parties are dipped
into a pool of vastly different values and process qualities. Mediation, in contrast
to litigation, highlights subjective, party-determined standards rather than
externally imposed ones, focuses on future behavior to resolve the dispute, and
elevates party preference above third-party decision-making. Furthermore,
mediation treats the dispute as unique and impacted by the relationship of the
individuals involved. In mediation, direct action by the court is avoided by the
creation of a party-crafted agreement. Thus, parties can experience "process
dissonance" by this clash of incompatible values when they enter a mediation as a
prerequisite to the trial process.
Perhaps the overarching consideration in the discussion of mediator
reporting on party behavior in mediation is that it would bring the mediation
process yet one more step closer to a subset of the litigation process. Indeed
some would argue that the "adjudication camel" already has more than stuck its
nose under the mediation tent. It will be only a matter of time before the "ill-
tempered beast" takes over the entire space.' 84 The drafting and approval of the
UMA by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
its concomitant adoption by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association sends it on its way for state legislatures to adopt its statutory scheme.
For some, the UMA is "...a step in the descent of mediation into something other
than intended.. .[and] the only way ...to avoid [that] fate...is to recognize the risks
of over-formalizing the process and to press for the preservation of some
semblance of the core purposes of mediation.'0
85
In part, what we have argued in this paper is that a mediator good faith
reporting requirement would have a deleterious effect on the mediation process. It
potentially would focus the parties and their lawyers on the litigable issues of a
good faith claim rather than on the interests and needs of the parties that might
make resolution of the dispute possible and fair. What is potentially more
troubling is that the identification of behavior that is inconsistent with good faith
is for some as difficult to define as what constitutes pornography.
There may be a number of values in the legal culture of our society that
could be named as likely leading to a legalization of the mediation process were
184. See Robert D. Benjamin, The Uniform Mediation Act: A Trojan Horse?
<http://www.mediate.com/ethics/ethicsforum2.cfm> (last updated Sept. 2001). Benjamin argues:
There is a real risk that, assuming states do adopt the Act, lawyers will tend to treat the
provisions as the last word of how mediation is supposed to be practiced, and those who are not
lawyers will too quickly defer and presume that mediation is the sole province of legal practice.
Id.
185. Id.
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there a mediator good faith reporting requirement. Professor Carrie Menkel-
Meadow has written extensively about the values of the adversarial versus the
non-adversarial systems. Those values associated with the adversary system are:
"zeal, client loyalty, partisanship, and nonaccountability.. .[while those values
associated] with ADR are problem-solving, joint-gain, and future orientation."'
' 86
Here, however, we will focus on only one which we think is the most
dominant. That is the characteristic of adversariness 8 7 seemingly ingrained in the
legal mind with the notion of zealous advocacy. While not wholly synonymous,
there is a strong relationship between a lawyer's view of all persons other than her
client as "others," potentially with interests adverse to her client. The two ethical
codes promulgated by the American Bar Association - The Model Code of
Professional Conduct of 1969, and its successor, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct of 1983 require zealous advocacy 88 within the bounds of the law. The
core principle of this "Dominant View" is that "...the lawyer must - or at least
may - pursue any goal of the client through any arguably legal course of action
and assert any nonfrivolous legal claim."' 89  William Simon, who gives an
articulate explanation of the Dominant View of lawyer ethics, goes on to note that
both the Code and the Rules "...legitimate the lawyer in pursuing any arguably
lawful goal of the client through any arguably lawful means. And both contain
categorical injunctions to keep information adverse to the client confidential,
subject only to narrow exceptions."' 90
Simon goes on to explain the characteristics of the Dominant View by
comparing it with the Public Interest View of lawyer ethics:
The basic maxim of the Public Interest View is that law should be
applied in accordance with its purposes, and litigation should be
conducted so as to promote informed resolution on the substantive
merits. The Public Interest Approach is less defined than the Dominant
one, but it tends to mandate disclosure of relevant information...; to reject
manipulation of form in ways that defeat relevant legal purposes...; and
to foreswear the use of procedure in a way that frustrates substantive
'9'
norms....
186. Menkel-Meadow, supra n. 149, at 409.
187. Lela Porter Love, Mediation: The Romantic Days Continue, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 735, 738 (May
1997). Of the adversarial paradigm, Love cites Leonard Riskin's two-decade old and still applicable
observation that "[tihe adversarial paradigm "assumes that each conflict can be reduced to findings of
fact and cognizable causes of action and that the application of rules or law to thefacts will result in an
appropriate 'win-lose' outcome. Here, the disputants remain adversaries. The outcome is
advantageous to one side, but disadvantageous to the others." Id. (citing Leonard R. Riskin, Mediation
and Lawyers, 43 Ohio St. L. J. 29, 44 (1982)).
188. The Model Rules abandon "zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law" and the Libertarian
rhetoric associated with it. Instead, they emphasize the instrumental function of various elements of
aggressive advocacy in promoting justice in the long run." William H. Simon, The Practice of
Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 53 (Harv. Univ. Press 1998).
189. Simon, supra n. 188, at 7. For counterview, see, David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An
Ethical Study (1988). See also, David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-
Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004 (May 1990).
190. Simon, supra n. 188, at 7.
191. Id. at 8-9.
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Simon further notes that for all their differences, the two perspectives
have a common style of decision making which he terms "categorical." He
identifies the characteristics of this decision making process in the following way:
Such decision making severely restricts the range of considerations the
decision-maker may take into account when she confronts a particular
problem; a rigid rule dictates a particular response in the presence of a
small number of factors. The decision maker has no discretion to
consider factors that are not specified or to evaluate specified factors in
ways other than those prescribed by the rule.'
92
In fairness to Simon, 193 he is referring primarily to the lawyer's decision
making as to when or whether to disclose client information. What is significant
for the purpose of the present discussion, however, is the formalism in the
decision making process vis- -vis a rule intended to guide behavior. It is this
kind of formalism combined with the narrow view of the client's interests that
can cause problems for the mediation process. A mediator reporting requirement
would dictate that the lawyer put on her adversarial role and be very much on the
lookout for the way to champion the narrowly conceived client interests - that is
how can she win or at least gain an advantage. If the rules imposed on the
mediation process permit the winning or the gaining of an advantage on behalf of
the client (i.e., the means used are not outside the legal boundaries), the values of
the legal culture mandate the lawyer's pursuit of the win or the advantage. The
requirement that the mediator make a good faith report to the court certainly has
the potential of setting up just such a win/advantage dynamic in the mediation
process.
It is the mindset of the lawyer, 194 trained to seek only the client's
interest to the exclusion of all other concerns that gives reason for pause. A
mediator good faith reporting requirement within the context of this mindset
would almost necessarily have an adverse effect on the mediation process. This
would come about not because of an intent by the law or the legal culture to
subvert the process but because the mindset needed to guard against acting in bad
faith, as well as the mindset necessary to determine whether there is a claim of
bad faith, results in behaviors better suited for adjudication than for mediation.
The behavior of the parties and their lawyers becomes guarded with an attitude
of adversariness. This is in contrast with what the mediation process should be
attempting to bring about - cooperation and collaborative problem-solving.
A good faith reporting requirement is at odds with the facilitative role of
the mediator which should be that of a promoter of understanding and
communication, not that of a quasi-policing agent. Professor Lela Love points out
192. Id. at 9.
193. Simon goes on to contrast the Dominant View and the Public Interest views with that of the
Contextual View. Here, he defends an approach to ethical decisionmaking "...in which decisions often
turn on 'the underlying merits'." The ". . . basic maxim is that the lawyer should take such actions as,
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice .... An
alternative formulation of the basic maxim might exhort the lawyer to act to vindicate "legal merits at
hand" of the matter at hand." Id. at 9-10.
194. Riskin, supra n. 103.
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in an article on the lawyer's role and responsibility in mediation that "[tihe
romantic days of mediation continue because the paradigm it embodies, its
underlying values and vision, are as compelling and laden with potential as
ever. ' 195 If she is still correct even after the adoption of the UMA, the process of
mediation must be protected against the ever-increasing encroachment of the
adversarial mindset of the legal culture and its inclination to make disputes
susceptible to resolution by translation into narrow claims that fit neatly into
categories of legal relief.
Turning once more to the legal culture and its influence on the mediation
process, it is useful to take a further look at Simon's discussion of the
Conventional View of lawyer ethics to get at the values that seem to be at work.
As Simon notes, the Dominant View is the most ardently partisan, with justice
being defined fairly narrowly to the interests (no matter how self-centered) of the
client. Broader issues of societal justice take a back seat. The Conventional
View, by contrast, would seem to allow the lawyer to take a broader view of her
responsibility to further justice in representing a client in an individual matter.
Even with that said, it must be kept in mind that "justice" is defined by Simon in
this context as the vindication the client's legal claim at hand. There is a sense
that "justice," therefore, is defined by the client's perception of what is achieved
on his behalf. Hence, there is a close connection between the Conventional and
Dominant Views.
Even if the Conventional View does require a more expansive view of
"justice" than the Dominant View, a view which might encourage the lawyer to
see her client's claim as being subject to resolution by more than simplistic court
dictums and determinations, there is the problem of what Simon calls
"convention. ' 96 He describes the operation of "convention" or custom andpractice in the following manner:
Lawyers are drawn toward convention by both practical and normative
forces. Practically, in a marketplace where lawyers compete for clients,
lawyers who reject conventions that favor clients will be at a
disadvantage in attracting them.. .Normatively, the fact that a practice is a
convention is some evidence of its soundness. The widespread use of a
practice may mean that most lawyers believe it has merit. This is
especially true of open, visible practices. And the more open and
widespread the practice, the greater the ability of authorities to assess and
police it, and hence the less need for lawyers to assume that
responsibility. Finally, denying a client the benefit of a conventional
195. Love, supra n. 172, at 743.
196. Simon writes:
Some lawyers feel that in the world of practice ethical analysis is typically trumped by the force
of convention. Where individual responses to an issue converge, they acquire the force of
custom or institutionalized practice, and once this happens, lawyers tend to follow the practice
more or less unreflectively.
Supra n. 188, at 158.
20031
HeinOnline  -- 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 95 2003
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2003, No. 1
practice means treating him differently from clients of other lawyers,
which might be inequitable. 1
97
The relevance for the instant discussion is that a mediator good faith
reporting requirement would put into operation many of the usual ways in which
lawyers think about winning and gaining advantage for their clients. Indeed,
many would argue that if they did not look for the good faith claim in a mediation
in which they and/or their client did not particularly like the direction of the
process, the lawyer would be doing her client a disservice. Further, the lawyer
might very well argue that if she did not look for that good faith claim, another
lawyer would. Simon's additional point, on the other hand, is well taken. "Some
of the values that underpin a conventional practice may be patently absent in some




... the strong conventionalist argument exaggerates not only the moral
force of convention, but its determinacy and
comprehensiveness.. .Lawyers lack good information about what other
lawyers do in many situations [and] practices often vary widely from one
geographical area to another and from one practice to another. 199
While these points may be true, it is difficult to see why there would not be a
resort to convention with regard to the demand that the mediator report bad faith.
Most lawyers would believe that they are experienced enough in legal
negotiations to have a good idea when the other party has bargained in good faith
or not. Determinacy and comprehensiveness in the case of whether to pursue a
good faith claim would not be far removed from the lawyer's personal knowledge
and what she would consider to be reliable personal experience. Convention,
therefore, would seem to have a significant impact on the lawyer's decision
making.
Even if Simon's "convention" is not at work in the mediation process as
we have outlined, there is a strong likelihood that the good faith claim will be seen
peculiarly as something that the lawyer knows and understands. The good faith
claim is much more likely to be seen as a routine legal conflict subject to and
governed by rules of legal doctrine generally applicable to contract negotiations.
This will be true even if the lawyer and client were able at the outset of the
mediation process to see the substantive dispute (e.g., a case of constructive
termination or a claim of age discrimination) as unique and not necessarily
governed by any rules of general applicability.
A good faith reporting requirement on the part of the mediator would
invite a greater degree of the legal paradigm to become a part of the mediation
process. As many commentators have noted: "[tihe institutionalization of
mediation ...requires a clear commitment to the essential nature and core values of
197. Id. at 158-59.
198. Id. at 159.
199. Id. at 160.
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mediation, or else the process will be subsumed by the status quo paradigm."
2 °°
Menkel-Meadow also sounds the alarm for the ADR field when she asks
"...whether new forms of dispute resolution will transform the courts or
whether.. .the power of our adversarial system will co-opt and transform the
innovations designed to redress some, if not, all of our legal ills."'20 1 The risks
inherent in the good faith reporting by mediators are that the mediation process
will be driven further in the direction of the adversarial paradigm. Such a
reporting requirement invites lawyers to continue "...acting from traditional and
conventional conceptions of their roles and values[.]
' 20 2
VI. CONCLUSION
It is still too soon to say whether the Uniform Mediation Act is the
Trojan Horse as some have warned.2 °3 It seems apparent to us, however, that the
good faith reporting requirement, left out of the Act, is best kept out. It is one less
thing in the belly of the purported beast that is likely to permit a full-scale assault
by the adversarial paradigm on the values and purposes originally associated with
mediation. Professor Menkel-Meadow's comments concerning her apprehensions
about mandatory court institutionalized forms of ADR seem on point here with
regard to any possible consideration about a mediator good faith reporting
requirement. The question pondered by Professor Menkel-Meadow is "...why the
adversary culture is as pervasive as it is in our legal culture and whether radical
transformation is possible. ' '204 The viewpoint of the instant discussion has been to
assume the pervasiveness of the legal culture and to argue that a mediator good
faith reporting requirement would have the effect of extending that influence even
further into the mediation process. It would exacerbate "process dissonance" by
infusing the mediation process with more litigation-type qualities instead of
maintaining the special un-litigation type qualities of mediation.
For those who fear that unchecked "bad faith" participation will swallow
up "good" mediation, the Uniform Mediation Act offers some hope. For the
extreme case of party or representative misconduct, aggrieved parties may turn to
the section on exceptions to the mediator privilege. The language of Section
6(b)(2) reads:
There is no [mediator] privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative
agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party
seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that the
evidence is not otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence
that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and
that the mediation communication is sought or offered in ... a proceeding
200. Love, supra n. 187, at 737.
201. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-
Opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (Summer 1991); See also, Dispute Resolution
Ethics : A Comprehensive Guide, (Phyllis Bernard and Bryant Garth, eds., Washington D.C.: ABA,
Sec. of Dispute Res. 2002).
202. Menkel-Meadow, supra n. 201, at 3.
203. Benjamin, supra n. 138.
204. Menkel-Meadow, supra n. 155, at 14.
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to prove a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a
contract arising out of mediation.
20 5
The Reporter's Notes state: "This section is designed to preserve
traditional contract defenses to the enforcement of the mediation settlement
agreement that relate to the integrity of the mediation process, which otherwise
would be unavailable if based on mediation communications. '" 20 6 Some mediator
disclosure of dishonest or coercive behavior could come in through this section on
a case-by-case basis.
The UMA's provisions regarding confidentiality, and mediator reports
and recommendations in particular, have received mixed reactions among dispute
resolution professionals. Dr. Gregory Firestone asserts that "the prohibition
against mediators making substantive reports to the court and the inadmissibility
of such reports in a court proceeding outlined in Section 7 does go a long way
toward preventing mediators from using the threat of an unfavorable report to
compromise the self-determination of any party., 207 On the other hand, Professor
Scott Hughes argues confidentiality should yield to protect the parties' right to
self-determination, thus allowing for mediator testimony of communications made
during a mediation session.20 8  Professor Phyllis Bernard responds that
prohibitions against mediator reports and evaluations to judges protect parties
against "the greatest process danger, ' '209 i.e., changing the role of the neutral from
facilitator to de facto decision-maker or surrogate for a court.
The Uniform Mediation Act has been called "no one's ideal approach"
but "a very workable framework for mediation consistent across the incredible
breadth of issues and across the complex of jurisdictions.,' 210 We have attempted
in this article to present a convincing argument that the dangers of allowing
mediator reports about party conduct and communications during mediation to
those who may ultimately rule on the case significantly outweigh the perceived
benefits. Elemental mediation values of party self-determination, mediator
impartiality, and confidentiality are reaffirmed by the UMA's prohibition against
mediator reports to the court. In sum, "[s]ubtle forms of coercion through
vigorous judicial enforcement of a requirement to mediate in good faith threaten
to erode the integrity of the mediation process.",
211
205. Unif. Mediation Act § 6(b)(2)(2001) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/UMA2001.
html> (accessed Mar. 12, 2003).
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Mediation Act, 22 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 265, 271 (2002).
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